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ENCOURAGING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
FOR THE CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS
Jeremy Charles Vanderloo *
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent highly publicized problems in several large corporations have raised
awareness to the importance of corporate management practices and oversight.'
While steps have been taken to improve corporate governance in publicly traded
corporations, little movement has been made to protect investors in non-publicly
traded companies. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was enacted to enhance cor-
porate governance procedures, protect shareholders in publicly traded compa-
nies, and in some cases, specifically prohibit questionable business practices.
However, many of these same principles of corporate governance can and should
be applied to non-publicly traded companies.'
II. BACKGROUND
The same potential for corporate mismanagement that occurred in public
corporations exists in non-publicly traded companies. While an individual col-
lapse of a non-publicly traded company would not have the same harsh impact as
Worldcom's collapse, the financial problems caused by such a failure would not
be without effect, because non-publicly traded companies play a major role in
the United States economy.' C corporations accounted for only eleven percent
of all U.S. firms by organization in 1997, despite accounting for seventy-five
percent of all U.S. firms' receipts.' S corporations accounted for ten percent of
all U.S. firms, and were responsible for sixteen percent of all firms' receipts that
year.' In Mississippi alone, there were 49,016 total firms employing 937,023
people in 1998.6 Of these firms, ninety-seven percent were small businesses
(less than five hundred employees), and they accounted for 449,393 jobs.' With
the number of jobs at stake in these small businesses, proper corporate gover-
nance in non-publicly traded firms may well be just as important to our economy
as effective governance in publicly traded firms.
* With grateful appreciation to my parents for their decades of encouragement, love and support.
1. See American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, Preliminary Report of the
American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, 58 Bus. LAW. 189, 190 (2002) [hereinafter
ABA Task Force] ("Few events in business history since the Great Depression have had the public impact of
the stunning collapse of Enron Corp. and other major companies in the past year.").
2. See The Council of Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance Policies, at http://www.cii.org/
dcwascii/web.nsf/doc/policies index.cm (last updated Sept. Oct. 13, 2004) ("The Council believes good gover-
nance practices should be followed by publicly traded companies, private companies and companies in the
process of going public.").
3. See The State of Small Business: A Report to the President, 17 (2001) [hereinafter "Small Business"],
at http://www.sba.gov/advo/ stats/stateofsb99_00.pdf ("Small businesses represent [ninety-nine] percent of
businesses, employ more than half of the American workwork force, and create two-thirds of the net new
jobs.").
4. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMPANY SUMMARY: 1997 ECONOMIC CENSUS 12
(Sept. 2001), http://www.census.gov/prod/ec97/e97cs- 1 .pdf.
5. Id.
6. Small Business, supra note 3, Table A.4 at 64.
7. Id.
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A. What is Corporate Governance?
Corporate governance refers to those procedures established within a compa-
ny's organization that allow director oversight of key officer decisions, provide
disclosure of material facts to investors and other stakeholders, and allow for
efficient and accurate decision making within the organization. Corporate gov-
ernance describes "the legal rules relating to the respective powers and duties of
directors, officers and shareholders. '8 "A good corporate governance structure is
a working system for principled goal-setting, effective decision-making and
appropriate monitoring of compliance and performance."9
B. The Importance of Corporate Governance to Close Corporations
Some argue that corporate governance is not as important an issue in a close
corporation, because managers, as substantial owners of the business, are much
more likely to act in the best interests of the business." However, as corpora-
tions continue to compensate managers with ownership rights, such as stock
options, there is much more alignment between ownership and control in pub-
licly traded corporations. High level managers in public companies therefore
have a substantial financial stake in their company and bear both the risks and
rewards of their decisions. Thus, managers of publicly traded companies are
probably just as likely as managers of close corporations to make decisions that
they believe will most benefit their company. However, these decisions may not
in themselves constitute good corporate governance.
"Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board
and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and
shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring, thereby encouraging
firms to use resources more efficiently."" There is no one formula for effective
governance, and no one standard that would necessarily fit the needs of both
small and large businesses.
Good governance is not a 'checklist' of the "'ten most important
best practices'," but to a large extent it is a state of mind - a con-
sidered balance between the need for the board to represent
shareholder interests and the need to ensure management feels
sufficiently free to focus on value creation. 2
8. American Bar Association, Managing Closely Held Corporations: A Legal Guidebook, 58 Bus. LAW.
1073, 1088 (2003). See also Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950-2000: Major
Changes but Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349, 349 (2000).
9. THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, at 2 (May 2002) [hereinafter
BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE], http://www.brtbusinessroundtable.org/pdf/704.pdf
10. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 271, 277 (1986) ("Where management and risk bearing are separate, as in publicly held corporations,
managers' incentives to act efficiently are weak because they neither bear the costs nor reap the benefits of
their actions.").
11. OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (Jan. 2004) [hereinafter OECD PRINCIPLES],
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1 9/29/23888981 .pdf.
12. BOB FELTON & MARK WATSON, THE NEED FOR INFORMED CHANGE IN THE BOARDROOM 10,
http://www.mckinsey.com/cIientservice/organanizationeadership/service/corpgovernance/pdf/Director
Opinion.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
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In this context, corporate governance should be adopted by both publicly owned
and closely held corporations.
Of course, the level of corporate governance that any individual firm needs
is a function of many different factors, not the least of which is the expense
involved in complying with various corporate governance requirements. In one
survey of chief financial officers, cost estimates for compliance with the require-
ments of Sarbanes-Oxley ranged from several thousand dollars to more than one
million dollars. 3 While some corporate governance requirements are mandatory
for publicly traded companies, closely held corporations should be able to bal-
ance their governance needs against their budgetary constraints. However, busi-
ness owners should recognize that corporate governance to a business is like a
parachute to a skydiver: one item on which you shouldn't mind spending a little
extra money.
Corporate governance is also an effective management tool for all business-
es. "' [C]orporate responsibility' should be understood to include behavior by the
executive officers and directors of the corporation that conforms to law and
results from the proper exercise of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the
corporation and its shareholders."' 4 Since these duties are already incorporated
in state law, an effective system of corporate governance will also ensure com-
pliance with the business's pre-existing legal obligations, a concern for business-
es of all types.15
III. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NEEDS OF PUBLICLY
TRADED CORPORATIONS AND CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS
Calls for increased standards in corporate governance are based upon bol-
stering investor confidence,16 upholding our free-market system,'7 and preventing
mandatory regulation through voluntary compliance.'" Likewise, effective and
meaningful corporate governance standards can be used by non-publicly traded
companies to increase capital available from outside sources,'9 prevent the
mandatory regulation that has been imposed upon public corporations, enhance
their business operations, and also reduce potential liability to stakeholders.
13. PROTIVITI, INC., INSIGHTS ON TODAY'S SARBANES-OXLEY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES 8
(Sept. 2003), http://www.protiviti.fr/downloads/CFOSurvey.pdf.
14. ABA Task Force, supra note 1, at 191.
15. But see Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of
Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 581 (2002) (discussing that net social benefits
are a better measure of corporate governance than benefit or harm to the firm).
16. See ABA Task Force, supra note 1, at 190-91 ("Investor confidence in the quality and integrity of
public company corporate governance is compromised, and the pace of calls . . . for regulatory reform has
quickened dramatically.").
17. See Promoting Better Corporate Governance in Listed Companies, Report of AFEP
AGREEF/MEDEF Working Group Chaired by Daniel Bouton, President of Societe Generale Bank, September
23, 2002, 1372 PLI CORP 465, 468 (2003) ("[T]here can be no free-market system without an underpinning of
trust in the rule of law.").
18. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the ALl Code, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984, 996
(1993) ("[J]udges, legislators, bureaucrats, and others who impose or administer mandatory rules - have less
information about governance needs of individual firms than do firm owners and managers.").
19. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 10, at 277 ("Those who attempt to attract other people's
money have incentives to adopt governance mechanisms that respond to potential investors' concerns.").
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A. Increasing Sources ofAvailable Capital through Effective Governance
The ability to attract additional outside capital is an important asset to many
businesses, because it allows them to seize opportunities that could only be real-
ized with additional investments. Frequent sources of new capital include both
the sale of new stock and loans from outside investors. Companies can attract
these stakeholders by lowering their perceived risk through implementation of
effective corporate governance.
1. Effective corporate governance is a means to attracting and protecting stake-
holders
A system of corporate governance is becoming an effective means of luring
new investors while also increasing value for existing shareholders. "An over-
whelming majority of investors are prepared to pay a premium for companies
exhibiting high governance standards. Premiums averaged 12-14% in North
America and Western Europe."20 These numbers indicate that the capital
required to implement a corporate governance system would be a wise invest-
ment by managers. 1 Likewise, failure to implement such a system could have
just the opposite effect.
One recent survey indicates that a majority of investors would avoid specific
companies with inadequate governance policies, and a third of those polled
would avoid those companies altogether.22 A majority of investors also place
equal or greater importance on corporate governance as compared to financial
issues.23 These numbers indicate that companies which fail to adopt proper gov-
ernance policies run the serious risk of driving potential investors away. 4
Beyond attracting new capital, corporate governance should also protect
stakeholders in the company. Just as holders of publicly traded stock need pro-
tections, so also do investors in non-publicly traded stock. Investors who own
only a few shares in a publicly traded company will be less likely to become
involved in that company's affairs, because if they dislike the direction the com-
pany has taken, they can sell their shares in the open market.2 In a non-publicly
20. McKINSEY & COMPANY, GLOBAL INVESTOR OPINION SURVEY: KEY FINDINGS 2 (July 2002) [hereinafter
GLOBAL SURVEY], http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/organizationleadership/service/corpgovernance/pdf/
GloballnvestorOpinionSurvey2002.pdf. See also Greenfield, supra note 15, at 584 ("The assumption is that
'[t]he price [of a company's securities] reflects the effects, good or bad, of corporate law and contracts ....'
(quoting FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 19
(1991)).
21. But see JOEL POPKIN & Co., ESTIMATION OF SMALL BUSINESS WEALTH, 36 (Sept. 12, 2002) ("[lI]t
would never be possible to determine what part of the market valuation of a firm is based on the underlying fun-
damentals and what part might be caused by 'irrational exuberance."'), http://www.sba.gov/
advo/research/rs217tot.pdf.
22. GLOBAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 2.
23. Id.
24. But see Hamilton, supra note 8, at 364 ("[T]here is surprisingly little evidence in the hundred plus
studies conducted since the 1970s that changes in corporate governance have had any significant effect on the
bottom line, one way or the other.").
25. Kerry Shannon Burke, Regulating Corporate Governance Through the Market: Comparing the
Approaches of the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, 27 J. CORP. L. 341, 367 (2002).
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traded corporation, however, there is no readily available market for a dissatis-
fied shareholder's shares. Since "the issue of [corporate] governance involves
the protection of the minority shareholders from oppression by the control
group,"26 effective governance is very important in a close corporation, where
overreaching by the majority shareholders is much more likely."
2. Effective corporate governance is a means to attracting and protecting creditors
Businesses borrow a great deal of money. In 1999, non-financial corpora-
tions borrowed $480 billion, while non-corporate businesses borrowed $106 bil-
lion.2" "While the supply of funds appeared to be adequate, the cost of borrow-
ing remained high and became an increasing concern to small firms in late 1999.
Commercial banks began to tighten credit standards and raised credit terms."29
With the tightening of available resources, a business that has implemented solid
governance standards would present less risk to a potential creditor than a simi-
larly situated business without those same governance standards. Therefore,
good governance could make a business more competitive in an economy where
lenders demand higher credit standards and lower risk.
B. Preventing Mandatory Regulation with Voluntary Governance
As previously discussed, many chief financial officers estimate that the costs
of implementing Sarbanes-Oxley will be substantial." A system of voluntary
compliance can be much more attractive to businesses because it allows them to
control their costs and determine their own level of risk, commensurate with
their level of governance.
"Although voluntary codes and principles have the advantage of main-
taining flexibility and avoiding excessive and costly legal regulatory measures,
the question of their effectiveness does arise."31 Voluntary regulation presents
both enforcement and compliance issues. 2 At the same time, "imposing a single
rule on all types of firms is fundamentally inconsistent with the adaptive nature
of corporate governance."33
26. Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in American
Corporations, 46 AM. J. CoMP. L. 317, 317 n.3 (1998).
27. But see Julian Javier Garza, Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Role of Minority Shareholders -
A Comparative Study, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 613, 636 (2000) ("Minority shareholders may not control the compa-
ny, but their role in a corporation through minority rights, fiduciary duties, requirements of fair dealing and
good faith, private agreements, and derivative suits influences corporate governance and makes minority share-
holders significant players in the corporate world.").
28. Small Business, supra note 3, at 20.
29. Id. at 20, 22.
30. See supra note 13, and accompanying text.
31. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, SURVEY OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE DEVELOPMENTS IN OECD COUNTRIES 32 (Dec. 2003) [hereinafter "OECD SURVEY"], http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/27/21755678.pdf.
32. See id. at 32-33 (discussing voluntary compliance shortfalls in other countries).
33. Ribstein, supra note 18, at 996.
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The opposing argument states that government regulation is needed, because
companies simply will not voluntarily police themselves, citing Worldcom and
Enron among others as examples that voluntary standards are ineffective.
Proponents of this argument point to Sarbanes-Oxley as filling a large gap in
state regulation. 4
At the same time, a system of mandatory compliance does not guarantee that
business managers will act with higher standards. "Policymakers need to identi-
fy compelling incentives to encourage family - and state - owned businesses
voluntarily to upgrade their governance practices - just forcing change through
regulations only creates a compliance, not a performance, mentality."3 This can
lead in turn to a process that merely hides improper behavior from the public
rather than discouraging such behavior altogether. 6
But consider that regulation can come from the courts as well as legislatures.
"[T]he state courts that review the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty of direc-
tors and officers can be expected to identify and give effect to evolving expecta-
tions regarding oversight responsibility, conflicts of interest, and director inde-
pendence . . . ."' Since business people prefer certainty over awaiting judicial
interpretation, small businesses may want to voluntarily reform themselves
before courts force reform.
C. Enhancing Business Operations with Corporate Governance
Effective corporate governance is also appropriate to the closely held corpo-
ration because it is a means of improving internal business operations. "To
remain competitive in a changing world, corporations must innovate and adapt
their corporate governance practices so that they can meet new demands and
grasp new opportunities."38 Thus, corporate governance creates more efficient
corporate management. "[G]ood corporate governance - that is accountable
governance - means the difference between wallowing for long (and perhaps
fatal) periods in the depths of the performance cycle, and responding quickly to
correct the corporate course."39
34. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public
Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 358 (2004) ("State law did not impose meaningful standards of behavior
... [and] [t]he SEC's attempts to encourage higher standards through the use of disclosure had not worked.").
See also Ribstein, supra note 18, at 987-88 ("The regulatory theory holds that, because corporate terms can be
imposed on owners, states will compete in a 'race to the bottom' to provide corporate statutory terms that serve
managers' rather than shareholders' interests."). But see BUSNEss ROUNDTABLE, supra note 9, at iv-v ("No law
or regulation alone can be a substitute for the voluntary adherence to these principles by corporate directors and
management .... ").
35. McKiNSEY & COMPANY, EMERGING MARKET POLICYMAKER OPINION SURVEY: KEY FINDINGS 1 (Nov.
2002), http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/organizationleadership/service/corpgovernance/
pdf/2002_EmergingMarketPolicymakerOpinionSurvey CorpGov.pdf.
36. See Burke, supra note 25, at 357 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of permissive corpo-
rate governance guidelines).
37. ABA Task Force, supra note 1, at 197.
38. OECD Principles, supra note 11, at 4.
39. The California Public Employees' Retirement System, Corporate Governance Core Principles, at
http://www.calpers-governance.org/principles/domestic/us/pageOlpageO2.asp (Apr. 1998) [hereinafter
"CALPERS Principles"].
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Effective corporate governance also encompasses internal management prac-
tices in addition to investor protections.
The same internal control infrastructure that supports Sarbanes-
Oxley compliance can also be leveraged to generate greater
business success. A host of benefits could result - improved
flow of information permitting better business decisions, better
management of resources, streamlined operations, improved
investor relations, and an enhanced reputation for leadership and
integrity in corporate governance and reliable financial report-
ing. 40
Another important reason to adopt good governance procedures is to prevent
negative publicity. There is a growing trend to publicize companies that do not
conform to generally accepted governance standards. 1
These factors for enhancing business operations through improved decision
making and avoidance of negative publicity translate equally to publicly traded
or closely held corporations.
D. Reducing Potential Liability for Inadequate Governance
By voluntarily adopting the corporate governance standards required of pub-
licly traded companies, close corporations can reduce their potential liability for
violations resulting from inadequate governance systems. There is little doubt
that, in the wake of recent scandals, stakeholders' expectations of management
have risen. "While there is no change in the fundamental legal principles applic-
able to the duties and responsibilities of the boards of directors, there is a clear
change in attitude by investors and the public at large that could manifest itself in
adverse judicial decisions and further legislation."42 And managers must be as
careful with the actions they fail to take as with the actions they do take.
"Today, the utter failure to follow the minimum expectations of the evolving
standards of director conduct, the minimum expectations of Sarbanes-Oxley...
might likewise raise a good faith issue."43 As the Chief Justice of Delaware has
further observed, "the issue of good faith may be measured not only by the
evolving expectations of directors in the context of [the] common law fiduciary
duty, but also against the backdrop of Sarbanes-Oxley and the [self-regulatory
organizations'] requirements, even though there may be no express private right
of action."44
40. DELOITTE & TOUCHE, LLP, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: LEVERAGING INTERNAL CONTROL TO BUILD A
BETTER BUSINESS, 3 (April 2003), http://www.fei/.org/download/beyond.pdf.
41. See The California Public Employees' Retirement System, Corporate Governance Business Plans, 5,
at http://www.calpers.org//calendarapps/board/adhoc/adhoc/200401/item4
0 /2D0leltem4-1e.doc (last visited
Oct. 15, 2004) (discussing their intent to nationally publicize an annual "Dirty 30" list of the worst governed
corporations).
42. Karen G. Krueger & David C. Karp, Corporate Governance in Light of Sarbanes-Oxley and the
NYSE Rules, in PLI COURSE HANDBOOK (2002), reprinted in 1348 PLI/CoRP 863,911 (2002).
43. E. Norman Veasey, Policy and Legal Overview of Best Corporate Governance Principles, 56 SMU
L. REv. 2135, 2141 (2003).
44. Id. at 2144.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W RE VIEW
The good news for managers is that this same shift in legal principles can
also be used by managers to justify some actions that may not have made eco-
nomic sense in the past, but which are required for good corporate governance.45
These increased standards expected of managers in publicly traded compa-
nies will not take long to seep over to close corporations. Therefore, an effective
system of corporate governance is an appropriate means by which closely held
corporations can reduce their potential liability to stakeholders.
IV. SUGGESTED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS
As previously mentioned, no one model of corporate governance may neces-
sarily fit the specific needs of every business. Yet at the same time, the princi-
ples of stakeholder protection, deterrence of mandatory regulation, enactment of
efficient business practices, and reduction in liability to stakeholders all apply to
any form of business entity, whether public or private. While there are many
different suggested models of effective corporate governance, there are several
principles which appear in multiple models. These principles would therefore be
appropriate for any business to follow, if possible.
A. Board of Director Duties
The Board of Directors is primarily responsible for selection and oversight
of the Chief Executive Officer and supervision of management's overall perfor-
mance.46 In order to properly supervise those responsible for daily operations of
the business, directors must know the business of their company, familiarize
themselves with the company's financial statements, and understand the mission
and strategic vision of their company. "The board should be engaged in actual
governance and not merely act as advisors to the CEO. '47 These responsibilities
require advance preparation by directors prior to all meetings. 8
In order to best perform their functions, the board should ideally be com-
prised of a majority of independent directors. The New York Stock Exchange
Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee has modified its def-
inition of "independent" so that "[n]o director qualifies as 'independent' unless
the board of directors affirmatively determines that the director has no material
relationship with the listed company (either directly as a partner, shareholder or
officer of an organization that has a relationship with the company)."49 Because
it may be difficult for a closely held corporation to maintain a board with a
45. See David S. Ruder, Public Obligations of Private Corporations, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 209, 219 (1965)
("An additional area of business activity which can be justified according to business judgment concepts is cor-
porate action taken either because the government is bringing indirect pressure upon the corporation or because
pressure might be used by the government.").
46. BUSINEss ROUNDTABLE, supra note 9, at 1.
47. E. Norman Veasey, An Economic Rationale for Judicial Decisonmaking in Corporate Law, 53 Bus.
LAW. 681, 699 (1998) (emphasis added).
48. See BUSINEss ROUNDTABLE, supra note 9, at 24.
49. Report of the New York Stock Exchange Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee,
6 (June 6, 2002) [hereinafter NYSE Report], http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp-govreport.pdf.
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majority of directors who meet this definition, closely held corporations should
create and disclose their own definition of independence that will ensure their
directors' ability to make independent decisions. This definition should ensure
"a lack of conflict between the director's personal, financial or professional
interests, and the interests of shareowners." 0 At a minimum, the following gov-
ernance functions should be performed entirely by independent directors: audit-
ing, director nomination, board evaluation, CEO evaluation and management
compensation, and ethics compliance.51
Another method for minimizing conflicts between a director's personal
interests and the interests of shareholders is to align directors' interests with
those of shareholders through equity compensation. "Directors should be incen-
tivized to focus on long-term stockholder value ... [so] a meaningful portion of
a director's compensation should be in the form of long-term equity." 2
Adherence to these guidelines should greatly improve the quality of corporate
governance in any organization.
B. Senior Management Responsibilities
"The CEO and senior management are responsible for operating the corpora-
tion in an ethical manner ... [and] should never put individual, personal inter-
ests before those of the corporation or its stockholders." 3 Senior management's
responsibilities include reviewing financial statements, supervising internal con-
trols, ensuring an atmosphere of ethical conduct, and providing a system of
reporting misconduct. It is essential that the CEO, or other senior manager,
communicates the status of these functions to the board. Senior managers
should also make corporate governance visible by incorporating those principles
in their company's mission statement. Such publication provides communication
of these governance principles to shareholders and outsiders.'
Just as with directors, senior managers' interests should be aligned with the
long term interests of their shareholders through the use of equity compensation.
"Compensation programs are one of the most powerful tools available to the
company to attract, retain, and motivate key employees, as well as align their
interests with the long-term interests of shareowners." s To further ensure that
shareholder interests do not conflict with senior management, and "[i]n order to
provide checks and balances on the process of earmarking shares to be used for
equity-based awards, and to provide shareholders a voice in the resulting dilu-
tion,... all equity-compensation plans, and any material revisions to the terms
of such plans... should be subject to stockholder approval.""
50. CALPERS Principles, supra note 39, at 4.
51. See CALPERS Principles, supra note 39, at 4.
52. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 9, at 25.
53. Id. at 9.
54. See NYSE Report, supra note 49, at 18-19 ("Given the importance of corporate governance, each list-
ed company's website must include its corporate governance guidelines, the charters of its most important
committees... and the company's code of business conduct and ethics ... .
55. CALPERS Principles, supra note 39, at 6.
56. NYSE Report, supra note 49, at 17.
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V. CONCLUSION
"[N]ew prohibitions and mandates, whether adopted by the NYSE, the SEC
or Congress, cannot guarantee that directors, officers and employees will always
give primacy to the ethical pursuit of shareholders' best interests."'" However,
an effective system of corporate governance, which provides oversight of man-
agement by independent directors and where the interests of directors and man-
agers are aligned with those of their stockholders, can significantly reduce the
risk of overreaching by corporate executives and provide increased protections to
all stakeholders. While there is a great deal of controversy concerning how
much oversight is enough, companies like Worldcom and Enron have clearly
shown how little is too little. "[I]t is a clear failure of corporate responsibility
when outside directors, auditors, and lawyers, who have important roles in our
system of independent checks on the corporation's management, fail to avert or
even discover ... the grossest of financial manipulations and fraud."58 By recog-
nizing that corporate governance is a continuing action, and by remembering
their fiduciary duties to their stockholders, directors and managers of closely
held corporations can stave off the negative publicity and loss of investor confi-
dence that befell the public stock market.
57. Id. at 1.
58. ABA Task Force, supra note 1, at 192.
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